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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS &
EMBALMERS ASSOCIATION, a
Utah corporation, on behalf of its
members, and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellant,

vs.
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE
VALLEY, INC., a Utah corporation;
MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC., a Utah
corporation; LAKE HILLS, a Utah
corporation; AULTOREST MEMORIAL CORPORATION; a Utah corporation; HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD HACKING and RAYMOND W.
GEE, members of the Business Regulation Commission of the State of
Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON,
Commissioner of Insurance of the
State of Utah,

Case No.

10236

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING AND RAYMOND W. GEE, members
of the Business Regulation Commission of the State
of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, Commissioner of
Insurance of the State of Utah
Said defendants-respondents will be referred to in this
brief as the Public Officer ;Defendants.
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action in the lower court seeking a declaratory judgment requesting that certain business practices
of the corporate defendants be declared illegal; that those
business practices involved violations of professional and
ethical conduct regulations for embalmers and funeral directors as provided .for in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of the
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and also violations of the PreArranged Funeral Plans law as contained in Section 22-4-4,
Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1957. Plaintiffs further sought a
declaratory judgment decreeing that the pre-need (!Ontracts
(R. 8-12, 19-20 and 39-41) issued and sold by the defendants, and through their associates, are insurance contracts, in consequence of which said contracts and the defendants would be subject to the insurance regulations of
the State of Utah supervising said contracts as insurance
contracts and said defendants as insurance companies.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was brought before the lower court for a
determination of the issues on a motion for a summary
judgment ( R. 32-35) asking for a declaration:
(a) That a licensed embalmer or funeral director
performing services pursuant to a pre-need contract obtained by solicitation is guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct as defined in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of
Utah Code Annotated 1953 and subject themselves to a
possible revocation of their license.
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(b) That pre-need contracts providing future funeral services such as those used by the defendants are insurance contracts and are not legally issued unless the company issuing the same qualifies as an insurance company
under the insurance laws of Utah.
(c) That pre-need contracts are in violation of law
unless they provide that all the earnings and interest on
monies paid in shall be held in trust until death of beneficiary and paid to no other person but the named payor
as provided in Sections 22-4-1 to 22-4-7 as enacted by Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chapter 45,
Laws of Utah 1957.
The matter was argued before the court without introduction of further evidence. The defendants raised the
issues of, and challenged (a) the constitutionality of portions of the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan law in Title 22,
Chapter 4, supra; and (b) whether or not there was a justiciable issue between the plaintiffs and the defendants and
the capacity of the party plaintiffs to sue.
The lower court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment; decided in favor of the defendants on
their claim that certain portions of the pre-need law are
unconstitutional; and found in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the plaintiffs had legal standing to prosecute
the action and that there existed a justiciable issue between
the plaintiffs and defendants.
The court is respectfully refered to the final decree
of the lower court as contained in the lower court's record
on file herein ( R. 44-48) .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The public officer defendants seek a clarification of
the laws of the State of Utah involved in this controversy.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are set forth under the heading
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

ARGUMENT
Inasmuch as briefs of the appellants and other respondents in this action will cover all of the points in issue, the
public officer defendants, in order to avoid repetition, will
limit their argument. to the following points:

POINT I.
THE PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT USED
BY DEFENDANT MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC.,
WHICH PERMITS SAID DEFENDANT TO RECEIVE THE EARNINGS OF THE TRUST
FUND ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 22-4-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF SAID SECTION
22-4-4.
Section 22-4-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as
follows:
"All payments and amounts so deposited, with
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be withdrawn until the death of the sole or one of the
beneficiaries, provided that said funds plus all in-
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terest and earnings shall be released to the payor
originally paying said funds under the purchase
agreement, and said payor shall be entitled to receive the same or any part thereof, at any time
prior to the death of any beneficiary, upon demand
upon said bank or trust company, and upon surrender of any pass book evidencing same."
Paragraph IV of the contract used by defendant,
Memorial Trusts, Inc., provides that the funds received
.from the purchaser shall be placed in trust, and then contains the following provision (R. 9) :

"* * * The Memorial Purchaser hereby revocably appoints Memorial Trusts, Inc. as agent to
demand and receive earnings of the trust funds and
to pay the same to itself in exchange for and in
consideration of the agreement of Memorial Trusts,
Inc .., to guarantee the services and facilities above
set forth regardless of future price increases. The
Memorial Purchaser agrees upon request to make
such dema;nd personally and pay said earnings to
Memorial Trusts, Inc., if for any reason such earnings are not so made available to Memorial Trusts,
Inc., as a part of its general funds. * * *"
The public officer defendants serving as the Business
Regulation Commission of Utah ,•have interpreted the above
provision as not being in violation of Section 22-4-4. The
basis for this interpretation is that Section 22-4-4 permits
the purchaser to withdraw the trust funds and the interest
and earning thereon at any time prior to the death of the
beneficiary upon the surrender of his passbook, and there
is nothing in the law which prohibits the purchaser from
appointing an agent to receive said funds, particularly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

since the appointment as agent is revocable. In effect, the
purchaser retains control over the trust funds.
POINT II.
THERE IS UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT THE PRE-NEED CONTRACTS SOLD
BY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE INSURANCE CONTRACTS, AND SUBJECT TO
THE INSURANCE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.
There is some uncertainty in the minds of the public
officer defendants as to whether the contracts of the cor..
porate defendants should be regulated under the Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law of the State of Utah or under the
State's insurance laws. Obviously there would be no need
for a Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law if all pre-need contracts were subject to regulation as insurance contracts. It
appears, however, that the Legislature contemplated that
some contracts of this type would constitute insurance, as
Section 22-4-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, of the Pre-arranged Funeral Plans Act, reads as follows :
"This act shall not apply to or affect the operations and business of duly licensed associations or
companies under the insurance laws of the state of
Utah."
While there is some division of authority as to whether
or not contracts for future burial expenses constitute insurance, it appears that the majority of cases hold that
they are insurance contracts. It is stated in Appleman on
Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 1, page 29, that:
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"Often a group of people will band together
and provide for the regular payment from each of
them of a small premium, or else provide .for a small
assessment from each one upon the death of any
member, to pay the burial expenses of any person
in that group. Often such associations are started
by enterprising undertakers, who themselves often
undertake to provide the necessary burial services,
perhaps agreeing in advance to undertake them for
a stipulated price. These contracts have come frequently before the courts for construction. The almost uniform tendency of the courts has been to
hold that they constitute life insurance, and as such,
the organization not having been licensed or approved by the Insurance Commissioner, the entire
scheme, and, necessarily, the individual contracts,
are void."
In the annotation on the subject in 63 A. L. R .., page
723, it is stated:
"While the authorities are not agreed as to
whether or not a contract for payment of burial expenses is in the nature of an insurance contract, the
majority of the cases answer this question in the
affirmative, and regard the contract as one of insurance. * * *"
Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines insurance as follows:
''Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies."
As pointed out on pages 22 and 23 of appellants' brief,
all of the contracts of defendants contain certain similari-
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ties. They promise to deliver, at some unknown future
date, or on demand, certain funeral merchandise as yet unidentified, and funeral services at the time death occurs.
From the foregoing definition of insurance, it appears
that the contracts of defendants contain the elements described in the definition, except possibly the element of
"spreading the risk over the group," which Justice Crockett
said was a necessary element of insurance in his concurring
opinion in In re Clark's Estate, 10 U. 2d 427., 354 P. 2d
112, 119. Also see Helvering, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. LeGierse et al., Executors, 312 U. S. 531, 539,
61 S. Ct. 646, in which the United States Supreme Court
said:
"Historically and commonly insurance involves
risk-shifting and risk-distributing. * * *"
It is noted that the contracts of defendants provide
that if the purchaser dies before having paid his contract
in full, the full purchase price must be paid, or arrangements made for its payment, before the merchandise or
services contracted for are furnished. Thus, there is no
sharing of risk as there is in the usual insurance contract.
There is, however, an element of risk in that the defendants do promise to furnish the merchandise and services
contracted for at the contract price, regardless of possible
future price increases.
There are a number of cases in which the contention
has been made that the benefits of the contract may be
taken before the death of the purchaser and are, therefore,
not contingent upon death. In South Georgia Funeral
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Homes, Inc., et al. v. Harrison, 184 S. E. 875, the defendant, sold option contracts in which he agreed, for the sum
of $12.00 per year, to sell the optionee certain articles of
merchandise and funeral services at a special cash price.
The contract also provided that it could be renewed and extended by mutual consent of the parties from time to time
at the rate of $1.00 per month, and that the optionees were
not bound to exercise the option but were free to purchase
the merchandise and services elsewhere. In holding that
the contract was a contract of insurance, the court said:
"The option contract is an agreement on the
part of the 'optionor' to sell certain enumerated
articles and services 'for the use of, or in connection with, said optionees and their minor children
and other dependents, any or all of them.' While
the exercise of the option is not expressly made contingent upon the death of any of them, the merchandise and services may be bought only for the
use of, or in connection with, the 'optionees,' their
minor children or dependents. As a general proposition we cannot conceive of what use a casket, burial clothes, funeral direction, etc., would be to a living person not engaged in the business of buying
and selling such commodities. Burial merchandise
and funeral services are peculiar commodities; they
are presumably used only in connection with, or for
the use of, a person who has departed life. For
these reasons we are of the opinion that the exercise of the option is contingent upon the death of
the 'optionees,' their minor children or dependents.
"The option contract provides that the 'optionee' upon the exercise of the option shall have
the right to buy from the 'optionor' certain merchandise and services at cost plus certain additional
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charges. This reduction in price is a benefit or
something of value to the 'optionee.' Under the
rulings in Benevolent Burial Association v. Harrison, 181 S. E. 829, section 56-901 of the Code of
1933, which provides that 'a life insurance policy
is a contract by which the insurer, for a stipulated
sum, engages to pay a certain amount of money if
another shall die within the time limited by the
policy. The life may be that of the insured or of
another in the continuance of whose life the insured
has an interest,' is not exhaustive as to the medium
of payment. 'Nor is it essential that loss, damage,
or expense indemnified against necessarily be paid
to the contractee. It may constitute insurance if it
be for his benefit and a contract on which he, in
case of a breach thereof, may assert a cause of action. * * *' From these rulings it follows that
the option contract is an insurance contract upon
the life of the 'optionee,' his minor children and
dependents."
See also State v. Mynatt (Tenn. 1960) 339 S. W. 2d
26; State v. Smith Funeral Service (Tenn. 1940) 145 S. W.
2d 1021.
In the case of State v. Globe Casket & Undertaking
Co., 143 Pac. 878, the Supreme Court of Washington said:

"* * * Its business is confined solely to the
sale of the certificates named in its articles, and
the performance, through the agency of others, of
the obligations assumed thereby. These certificates
are in two forms. In the one the corporation agrees,
on the death of the holder, 'to take charge of the
burial of said holder, and provide the necessary
furnishing and materials therefor to the value of
one hundred ($100) dollars, as follows: One black
broadcloth, white or colored plush casket; one out-
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side box for casket; one hearse; two carriages; one
burial robe; necessary embalming; necessary acces...
sories; and services of funeral director.' The other
is similar in form, with the exception that it does
not name the value of the furnishings, and provides
that the corporation will take charge of the funeral
of the holder 'on the surrender of this receipt,' and.
will furnish the hearse and two carriages in places
only where they are obtainable. Sales of the certificates are made through the agency of solicitors
on the installment plan. * * *
"As to the first contention, we think the business is clearly insurance. The contract evidenced by
the certificate has all of the elements of a life insurance contract. It is an agreement to perform a service which can become obligatory only on the death
of the certificate holder. While no beneficiary of
the promise is named, in reality one exists, and may
be ascertained with as much certainty as if directly
and specifically named. It is the person who would
otherwise be obligated to pay the expenses of the
burial. This may be the heir of estate of the decedent, his relatives, or the state. * * *"
For similar holdings, see Sisson v. Prata Undertaking
Company, (R. I. 1928) 141 A. 76; State v. Stout (Tenn.
1933) 65 S. W. 2d 827; Renschler v. State (Ohio 1914) 107
N. E. 758. Annotations and addition} case citations on the
subject are contained in 63 A. L. R. 711, 723; 68 A. L. R.
1525; 100 A. L. R. 1449; 119 A. L. R. 1241.
In conclusion, the public officer defendants are uncertain as to whether or not the pre-need contracts involved
in this matter are insurance contracts and subject to regulation under the insurance laws of the State. It appears
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to said defendants, however., despite many decisions to the
contrary, that said contracts lack a sharing of the type of
risk necessary to constitute insurance. It further appears
to said defendants that if said contracts provided that the
merchandise and services contracted for would be furnished to the purchaser without payment in full of the contract price if the purchaser should die prior to having paid
the complete price, that such a "sharing of the risk" element would be present as to make such contracts insurance
contracts.
POINT III.
THAT THE PREARRANGED FUNERAL
PLANS ACT (SECTIONS 22-4-1, 22-4-2, 22-43, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 and 22-4-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The corporate defendant-respondents contend that the
Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law (Sections 22-4-1 through
22-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953) is unconstitutional in
that it violates Article I, Sections 1 and 7, of the Constitution of Utah, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The public officer defendants
maintain that said Act is constitutional and within the
police power of the State.
The Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law provides, among
other things, that all funds received in payment of contracts for the furnishing in the future of funeral services
of merchandise in connection with the .funeral are trust
funds which must be deposited in a bank or trust company.
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Such funds, however, may be released, including any earnings or interest, to the payor originally paying said funds
under the purchase agreement. (Section 22-4-4, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, supra). It is apparently the position of
the other defendant-respondents that these requirements
attempt to prohibit or confiscate their business under the
guise of regulation.
The question of the constitutionality of statutes similar to Utah's Pre-Arranged Funeral Plans law has come
before the courts several times in recent years, and it appears that the majority of decisions have sustained their
constitutionality. Rather than set forth in this brief the
lengthy arguments and reasoning found in these cases, the
court's attention is directed to the case of Reserve Vault
Corporation, et al., v. Clint Jones, et al., 356 S. W. 2d 225,
which was decided in 1962 by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and which reviews completely the constitutional
questions pertaining to prearranged funeral plan laws.
This case also quotes extensively from the frequently cited
cases of Memorial Gardens Association, Inc., v. Smith (Ill.
1959) 156 N. E. 2d 587, and Falkner v. Memorial Gardens
Association (Tex. 1957) 298 S. W. 2d 934. It also quotes
from the excellent dissenting opinion found in State v.
Memorial Gardens Development Company (W. Va. 1958)
101 S. E. 2d 425,, 68 A. L. R. 2d 1233, which case held unconstitutional a statute similar to Utah's.
One of the arguments advanced for upholding statutes
similar to Utah's Pre-Arranged Funeral Plans Act as a
proper exercise of the police power of the State is the possi-
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bility of fraud in prearranged funeral contracts. This possibility is graphically illustrated by the following quotation from State v. Mynatt (Tenn. 1960) 339 S. W. 2d 26:
"A very important reason for the enactment
of such legislation as we have is shown by the case
before us. The defendant concedes that during the
last 20 years he has issued some 35,000 of these
contracts, and the record does not show how many
of the contracts are now in .force and effect, but it
is obvious that the potential liability is tremendous.
"Let us assume that all 35,000 contracts are
now in force and effect and that the personal representatives of each contract should demand a $500
funeral. The value of 35,000 funerals would amount
to $17,500,000. Of this sum the defendant, by reason of the 50% discount provision, would be liable
for $8,750,000."
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CONCLUSION
The public officer defendants-respondents respectfully
submit that the Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law of the
State of Utah does not prevent a purchaser of a pre-need
.funeral contract from appointing the seller as his agent to
withdraw and keep the interest or earnings from the funds
held in trust under the provision of Section 22-4-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953; that it appears to said defendants
that the pre-need contracts involved in this controversy
are not insurance contracts and are not subject to regulation by the Utah Commissioner of Insurance; and that the
Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law (Sections 22-4-1 through
22-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953) is constitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
H. WRIGHT VOLKER
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents,
Public Officer Defendants
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